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28 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT:

Rumour regarding Defense Department

Representation on the IAC

1. OIC comments on this subject, requested by the DDI, are as follows: First, it is not clear to OIC whether the subject rumour is:

- (a) That the Defense Department may create a single intelligence agency for the Department of Defense, with one representative to the IAC, or,
- (b) That the Department of Defense may leave the military intelligence agencies as they are but substitute one representative of all of them in place of the individual representative each now has.

#### Discussion:

or in the NSCID's which prevents the Secretary of Defense from creating a single military intelligence agency. In this regard, the Act of 1947, Section 102(d)(3) assigns to the Agency the duty "to correlate and evaluate intelligence... using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities:... Provided further that the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence." (Emphasis supplied.) This does not imply that all then existing agencies and facilities must forevermore continue to exist; the proviso is understood to be for the protection of any agencies, other than CIA, which from time to time may exist and not for the protection of CIA. NSCID-1, paragraph 4,

refers to this point by stating that the Director shall not duplicate the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies, and shall "make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)

- 3. NSCID-1, paragraph 1, in defining the membership of the IAC, has always enumerated the existing intelligence chiefs. The 7 July 1949 revision added the Director, FBI. Were there to cease to be an intelligence chief from the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, and from the Joint Staff, and a single intelligence chief were instituted instead, NSCID-1, paragraph 1, would logically have to be revised.
- 4. It might well be more efficient for the Secretary of Defense to administer armed forces intelligence under a single head. Our concern should be that the benefit of thinking regarding ground, air and naval intelligence continues to have its applicability in national estimates and other cooperative research and that the collection facilities of the military services play their proper role in community intelligence efforts.

#### Recemmendation:

5. On netification of such plan, the Director should, as appropriate either with the Secretary of Defense, the military intelligence agencies, or the IAG as a whole, canvass the probable effects on the intelligence community of the implementation of such a plan. It might be necessary for the Director to advise the NSC of such effects with recommendations as necessary.

### Discussion:

6. If 1(b) is the case, namely, military agencies as they are but a single representative to the IAC, the Secretary of Defense would seem to be out of line with the NSCID's, if not the Act. In such event at a minimum the effect might be to make more cumbersome the relations between the other agencies and those in the Department of Defense in that the establishment of a single representative would indicate a single channel into

military intelligence. In all likelihood that representative would have with him at the IAC representatives of the still existing Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence units. It is difficult, after reflecting on our past experience, to see in what way the estimating business would benefit by having a single representative. It would likely have the effect of restricting the healthy interplay of different points of view which is encouraged by the present system.

## Recommendation:

7. That, if informed that the Secretary of Defense is leaving the military intelligence agencies as they are but substituting a single representative to the IAC, the Director explore with the Secretary of Defense and/or the military intelligence chiefs the effects of the proposal on national intelligence and on our arrangements for cooperation in other fields. It might be recomm to almost the NCC against and change

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Note: No change in Defense representation on the IAC, with or without Defense Department reorganization in intelligence, would challengelthe Director's role under the Law or the NSCID's nor would it in either case have any effect upon the once-argued question of whether the IAC should be "advisory" to the Director or something more.